Insurance -- Automobile Liability Policies -- Proportionate Distribution for Multiple Claimants by Marks, Benjamin S., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 35 | Number 2 Article 10
2-1-1957
Insurance -- Automobile Liability Policies --
Proportionate Distribution for Multiple Claimants
Benjamin S. Marks Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin S. Marks Jr., Insurance -- Automobile Liability Policies -- Proportionate Distribution for Multiple Claimants, 35 N.C. L. Rev. 313
(1957).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol35/iss2/10
NOTES AND COMMENTS
burden of proving his ownership,170 and the condemnor may show that
the title is in some third person.171
Statute of limitations:
Property may be acquired by the state or condemnor by user or
adverse possession for the requisite period, in addition to grant, dedica-
tion, or condemnation."' 2 If the charter of the condemnor provides that
all claims for compensation must be made within a certain time, this is a
positive statute of limitations and bars all claims of parties sui juris not
made within that time.' 7 3 But if the statute or charter is silent as to
when the claim for compensation must be brought, the owner may sue
any time before the period for adverse possession or prescription has
expired. 74
GERALD CORBETT PARKER
Insurance-Automobile Liability Policies-Proportionate Distribution
for Multiple Claimants
Multiple claims arising under an automobile liability insurance policy,
when the insured motorist is insolvent and the proceeds of the insurance
fund are insufficient to cover all claims, have created a situation in which
some of the claimants find that instead of receiving compensation for their
injuries, they will receive only a valueless judgment against the tort-
feasor.
This situation is growing; one has only to look at the records to see
that deaths and injuries on our highways are increasing; that judgments
are larger, resulting in a corresponding increase in settlements. The
coverage of insurance policies is relatively small in comparison to these
increases.
To illustrate, suppose that A, the insolvent motorist, negligently col-
170 Fuller v. Elizabeth City, 118 N. C. 25, 23 S. E. 922 (1896).
1U Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N. C. 97, 63 S. E. 180 (1908). A trap was
laid for the title searcher in Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868
(4th Cir. 1955), which held that the North Carolina statutes relating to recording
and cross-indexing of judgments have no application to federal judgments of
condemnation. This means that the title lawyer must inquire at the office of the
Clerk of the United States District Court before his title is cleared. As to parties
other than the United States, condemnation judgments must be recorded and cross-
indexed in the office of the superior court clerk of the county in which the land is
located, but judgments are recorded as special proceedings judgments and are
exempt from the requirements as to registration of deeds. Carolina Power &
Light co. v. Bowman, 228 N. C. 319, 45 S. E. 2d 531 (1947). Nevertheless, such
judgments must include a description of the land and the estate or interest se-
cured by the condemnor. Beal v. Durham & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 298, 48 S. E.67U 1904).Sexton v. Elizabeth City, 169 N. C. 385, 86 S. E. 344 (1915).
171 Carolina Cent. R. R. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C. 746 (1886).
'17 Carolina & N. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51 S. E.
2d 301 (1949) ; Love v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 221 N. C. 469, 20 S. E. 2d
337 (1942).
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lides with another automobile driven by B. B was not at fault. Guests
X, Y and Z in A's car were seriously injured. Guests M and N in B's
car were killed. B was seriously injured. A has a liability policy with
a coverage of $5000 for injuries to any one person and $10,000 for any
one accident. X settled for $3500. M's estate settled for $6000. N's
estate secured a judgment for $10,000, receiving $500 from the insurer,
as the balance due on its liability under the policy. B and Z have already
started their respective suits but have not received a judgment. Y, who
suffered a back injury, has not commenced his suit because he is partially
paralyzed and the full extent of this paralysis cannot be determined until
sometime in the future. Therefore, under the principle, "first come, first
served" which apparently prevails in this State,' X and M's estate are
paid in full, and N's estate got only $500 of the $10,000 judgment. B,
Z and Y will receive nothing of the proceeds of the insurance fund.2
An unfortunate, collateral aspect of the situation of multiple claims,
arising out of an accident when the insurance is insufficient and there is
an insolvent motorist, is that the insurer possesses the power to force
inequitable settlements upon claimants with a threat of preference to
the others if anyone of them does not submit. For example, suppose that
X, Y and Z are injured by the negligence of A, the insolvent, insured
motorist. A's policy covers up to $10,000 for any one accident. X, Y
and Z are willing to settle for $6000 each, even though they stand a good
chance of getting more in a court action. The insurer approaches each
claimant in turn and threatens to pay the insurance proceeds to the
other claimants, if he does not settle for $3000. X, Y and Z submit to
this pressure. Therefore, the insurer has saved itself $1000 plus the cost
of defending an action brought by any of the claimants.
North Carolina has realized the need to protect innocent, injured
parties from the financially irresponsible motorist.8 It is not the purpose
'While no case has arisen in this State involving a liability insurance policy,
priority in judgments is recognized in N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-215, 1-233 (1953) and
44-40 (1950). Since settlements are allowed by statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540(1953), a reasonable deduction would be that payment of settlements could be made
in preference to subsequent judgments.
2 This is only one of many possible combinations of claims involving serious
injuries and death. This illustration is indicative of such combinations.
A similar situation is possible in a separate and distinct suit by a parent for
the loss of services of a child. Automobile Underwriters v. Camp, 109 Ind. App.
389, 32 Ni. E. 2d 112 (1941). North Carolina allows such a suit. Ellington v.
Bradford, 242 N. C. 159, 86 S. E. 2d 925 (1955).
That a husband or wife may not maintain a separate suit for loss of consortium,
mental anguish, nursing and care, or any other damage that the injured spouse
might recover in an action against the tort-feasor. Helmsteller v. Duke Power Co.,
224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1945) (suit by husband) ; McDaniel v. Trent Mills,
197 N. C. 342, 148 S. E. 440 (1929) (suit by wife). See Note, 29 N. C. L. REv.
178 (1950) (loss of consortium).
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1-.39 (1955), known as the Motor Vehicle Safety-
Responsibility Act of 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Responsibility Law).
See Survey of Statutory Changes, 31 N. C. L. Rav. 420 (1953).
A survey of other plans now in effect throughout the United States and Canada
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of this note to discuss the sufficiency of the coverage required under the
Responsibility Law, but rather to suggest a solution to the situations
under the existing forms of liability policies. The solution, the writer
feels, must provide for some method of proportionate distribution of the
insurance fund among the various claimants.
Pro Rata Distribution-Argument Against:
The courts' argument against ratable distribution is that such a
procedure would eliminate settlements and require the reduction of all
claims to judgments, in order to determine judicially what the pro rata
share shall be, thereby increasing litigation; that such a change would
make it necessary for the insurance company to ascertain, before it
could safely pay anyone, how many persons might have claims on the
policy and what the total amount of judgments which might be presented
would be.4
In answer to contentions that failure to allow ratable distribution
results in inequitable preferences and is contrary to public policy, the
courts have said that since the insurance policy does not disallow settle-
ments, equitable results may be reached in this manner. 5
Statutes are in force in these jurisdictions which have refused pro
rata distribution, requiring that the form of automobile insurance policy
must be one of a liability form, instead of the indemnity form. Under
the liability form, the insurer is liable regardless of the solvency or
insolvency of the insured, and it is not a condition precedent to the
insurer's liability that the insured make satisfaction of a judgment ob-
tained against the insured. In other words, the injured person may
maintain an action on the policy of insurance against the insurer upon its
failure to pay a judgment received against the insured; that is, coverage
attaches when liability attaches, regardless of actual loss by the insured
at the time, and the coverage inures to the benefit of the party injured.6
The courts have answered the contention that these statutes require,
by their nature, pro rata distribution, by saying that the absence of a
provision in these statutes for proportionate distribution does not lend it-
self to a construction that these statutes include the same and that it is
may be found in Plummer, Uncompensated Automobile Accident Victim, 1956
INS. L. J. 459; Note, 66 HaRv. L. REv. 1300 (1953).
'Pisciotta v. Preston, 170 Misc. 376, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 44 (1938); Stolove v.,
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 157 Misc. 106, 282 N. Y. S. 263 (1935); Bruyette v.
Sandini, 291 Mass. 373, 197 N. E. 29 (1935) ; Bartlett v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 117
Conn. 147, 167 Atl. 180 (1933).
' Bruyette v. Sandini supra note ,4; Bartlett v. Travelers' Ins. Co. supra note 4.
The liability form is required in North Carolina. See, N. C. GEN. STAT. §
20-279.21 (1955) (Responsibility Law); All other automobile insurance policies
which are not held to meet the Responsibility Law are of the liability form throtigh
the power of the Insurance Commission to regulate. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9(1950). See also, Hall v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co., 233 N. C. 339, 64
S. E. 2d 160 (-1951).
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not the power of the courts to legislate. 7 Further, the courts have
emphasized that under the terms of the contract, in which the insured is
forbidden to settle any claim, except at his own cost, and which accords
the insurer the exclusive right to adjust such claims,8 to disallow settle-
ments would be a breach of the contract and would materially prejudice
the insured and leave him at the mercy of the jury. The courts further
pointed out the advantages9 to be gained from settlements by all parties
concerned, as outweighing the disadvantages. 10
It is apparent from the courts' argument that the main objection to
proportionate distribution would be the termination of settlements. They
feel that reduction in litigation is to be valued above equality.
Pro Rata Distribution-Argument For:
In the case of Century Indemnity Co. v. Kofsky," an action in
equity, the court allowed the insurer, under a liability policy, to inter-
plead the claims of four judgment creditors arising under the policy, and
the court further provided for a proportionate distribution of the
proceeds among the judgment creditors, regardless of the time
when actions were commenced or judgments rendered. The Chief
Justice, who wrote the opinion of the court, in dictum, said, "The
exigencies of this case do not require that we deal at large with the
various situations which might be presented where several parties suffer
injuries by reason of a single accident and the total amount recovered
against the insured exceeds the limits of the obligation of the insurer.
Such a contingency seems not to have been contemplated when the
statute in question was enacted,12 and it is a matter which might well
have the attention of the Legislature, as it has in New York, for instance,
in a particular class of cases.' 3 We would, in the absence of strong con-
siderations to support such a ruling, be reluctant to apply legal principles
which would recognize any priority between the judgment creditors."'14
7 It was further stated that to give these statutes the construction sought would
also restrain the motorist or the Secretary of State, depending on whether the
motorist furnished cash or bond, instead of a liability insurance policy, from utilizing
the funds so created as a means of compromising any claim arising out of the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle even to the extent of exhausting the entire
fund.
' This same provision appears in policies issued in this State.(1) As compensation to the injured party without the delay, expense, incon-
venience, anxiety and uncertainty of result attendant upon pursuit of litigation;
(2) Relief of the insured from similar annoyances; and (3) The benefit to the
insured and the insurer of settlement below maximum coverage.
10 Bartlett v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 At. 180 (1933).
115 Conn. 193, 161 Atl. 101 (1932); Accord: Underwriters for Lloyds of
London v. Jones, 261 S. W. 2d 686 (Ct. App. Ky. 1953).
" The court is here referring to the statute which makes all automobile
insurance policies of the liability form and makes the insurer liable regardless of
the solvency or insolvency of the insured.13 This particular class of cases is discussed later in this note.
1 Century Indemnity Co. v. Kofsky, 115 Conn. 193, 197, 161 Atl. 101, 103 (1932).
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Pro Rata Distribution-Allowed:
Several states, New York the leader, by statute,15 have provided for
ratable distribution of insurance proceeds in the case of motor vehicles
for hire, applicable only in cases where the insured is either bankrupt or
insolvent.' 6 In the case of Bleirneyer v. Public Service Mut. Casualty
Ins. Corp.,17 Cardozo, C. J., set out the appropriate procedure by which
ratable distribution is to be made under the statute. It is first required
that a claimant secure a judgment in an action at law; then this same
claimant is to bring an action in equity, on behalf of himself and all the
other claimants, for an interlocutory judgment requiring other judgment
creditors to prove their claims within a stated time if they wish to share
in the fund. If claims are in litigation, but have not yet been reduced to
judgment, there is a reasonable allowance of time, six months, or a year,
or whatever other period is fair in the light of all the circumstances, with-
in which claims are to be perfected. When the allotted time elapses,
final judgment is rendered for the proportionate distribution of the fund,
according to the amount of their respective judgments, among the judg-
ment creditors entitled. It was further set out that the action in equity
for the interlocutory judgment does not have to be postponed until the
other claimants' rights are barred by the Statute of Limitation.
In a similar case,' 8 involving a similar statute, the court held that
the policy of insurance is for the benefit of all, but that a claimant has no
right to rely upon other claimants or the insurer to protect his interest
in seeing that the fund is apportioned, and that under circumstances
which to his knowledge show him that they are not acting for him, in the
absence of any collusion between the insurer and the other claimants, he
has the duty to exercise reasonable diligence to prosecute his own claim,
so as not to lead the insurer to believe that he has abandoned his claim.
In which case, if he fails to act, he is precluded from recovery by laches.
From Whom the Remedy Must Come:
In those jurisdictions which have refused to pro rate the insurance
fund, the courts have uniformly held that, in the absence of an express
provision, the policy cannot be construed to include proportionate dis-
tribution. This has even been true of jurisdictions which have passed
the "motor vehicle for hire" acts when the statute does not provide for
ratable distribution.' 9 It is interesting to note that in all these cases
'IN. Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 282-b, transferred to VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW§ 17.
" Frank v. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., 136 Misc. Rep. 186, 239 N. Y. S.
397 (1930).
"221 N. Y. S. 794, 165 N. E. 286 (1929).
"Darrah v. Lion Bonding & Surety Co., 200 S. W. 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
"O'Donnell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 50 R. I. 275, 146 AtI. 770
(1929) ; Turk v. Goldberg, 91 N. J. Eq. 283, 109 Atl. 732 (1920).
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the Bleimeyer case was distinguished because of its statutory provision
for ratable distribution, but the courts never denounced its equitable
advantage.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has never ruled upon this
question of ratable distribution. The views of the courts of other jurisdic-
tions, that they will not rewrite the insurance contract to include pro
rata distribution, probably explain counsels' reluctance to seek such re-
lief.20
Therefore, the writer feels that if relief is to come, it will have to be
by act of the Legislature.-1
There are, the writer feels, certain justifications in our statutes and
the purposes for which they were passed for finding that all injured
parties have a beneficial interest in the proceeds of the insurance fund to
such an extent that the Legislature would be warranted in requiring all
such insurance policies to include a provision for pro rata distribution of
the proceeds in the case where multiple claims arise out of a single
accident, or the Legislature may say in the statute that all policies carry
this implication.
The change over from indemnity to the liability form of policy, under
which the latter provides that the insurer is liable upon the adjudication
of a claim against the insured and gives the injured party a right of
action against the insurer if he does not meet this obligation ;22 the
purpose23 of the Responsibility Law to protect injured parties from
financially irresponsible motorist; the provisions under the Responsibility
Law prohibiting the insurer from cancelling the policy after the accident
has occurred by any agreement with the insured, or from defeating the
policy because of a statement made by the insured or on his behalf, or
from voiding the policy for a violation by the insured,24 give support to
a construction that all injured parties have a beneficial interest in the
proceeds of the insurance.
Compromise:
The position of the courts that ratable distribution would disallow
settlements is not without merit.25 But this position is based upon the
20 No recent cases in other jurisdictions have been found.
21 Possibly the relief could come through action by the Insurance Commissioner
under his statutory power to regulate the form of insurance policy which shall be
used in this State. See, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9 (1950).
' See note 6 supra.
23 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-225 (1950) and 20-279.38 (1955). N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1955).
215 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1955) specifically provides for settlements.
However, the writer feels that equality should not be subordinate to a maxim
advocating reduction in litigation, no matter what the cost.
The justice of proportionate distribution of limited funds is well recognized.
Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216, 25 L. Ed. 864 (1879); Monmouth Lumber Co. v.
[Vol. 35
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assumption, it seems, that proportionate distribution requires that all
claims be perfected through an action of law. This is the procedure
required under the "motor vehicle for hire" acts.
However, the writer feels that an equitable solution can be reached
which provides for ratable distribution and settlement and which main-
tains a balance between and retains the advantages and equities of both.
Suggested Solution:26
A statute could be passed providing that:
1. When the multiple claim, insufficient insurance situation arises, there
will be a pro rata distribution of the insurance fund, according to the
amount of the claimants' respective settlements or judgments, without
regard to when either were obtained.
The statute should set out certain criteria for determining when a
multiple claim situation arises from which it will be necessary to pro
rate the insurance fund. For example, the provisions of the statute may
be made to apply only when three or more persons, other than the in-
sured (or one of the insured, if there are two or more automobiles in-
volved and the motorists are insured), of which two or more of such
persons are either killed or injured to such an extent that each is re-
quired to be hospitalized for more than a certain number of hours.2 7
2. When the multiple claim situation arises, the insurer shall have the
right to settle any and all claims, but the insurer shall not be permitted
to discharge such settlement. 28  Instead, the claimant should be allowed
Indemnity Insurance Co., 21 N. J. 439, 122 A. 2d 604 (1956) (citing the Kofsky
case, note 11 supra, and quoting the dictum of the Chief Justice in that case).
The provision of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (1955) calling for assigned
risk plans indicates the willingness of this State to pro rate to bring about an
equitable solution. See also, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 44-11 (1950) (pro rata distribu-
tion on subcontractors' liens).
"' Illustrations will be based on the hypothetical case set out at the beginning of
this note. The insurance coverage will be $5000/$10,000 because this is the
minimum allowed under the Responsibility Law. B, Y and Z received judgments
of $4000, $15,000 and $6500, respectively.
" The suggestion, applying the statute only to the situation when two or more
persons are either killed or hospitalized for more than a certain number of hours,
is to eliminate those accidents in which the injuries are not serious, or if only one
is serious, and the insurance fund will be sufficient to cover all claims.
This suggestion, however, will have the effect of restricting settlements in a
non-serious accident to the extent that such cannot be made until it can be de-
termined that a multiple claim accident under the statute is not involved; in other
words, until the time of hospitalization has passed it will be impossible to determine
whether or not a multiple claim situation arising under the statute is present.
However, there is no serious objection to such a short delay because fast settle-
ments should be scrutinized. In fact, many states have statutes prohibiting settle-
ments until a certain length of time has expired after an accident.
"' This provision should eliminate most of the power in the hands of the in-
surer to force inequitable settlements upon claimants with threats of preference.
For example, under the hypothetical case in which the total of all claims was
$45,000, each claimant's proportionate share of the $10,000 insurance fund would
be as follows: B, $888.90 ($4000) ; M, $1333.34 ($6000) ; N, $2222.22 ($10,000)
X, $777.80 ($3500) ; Y, $3333.34 ($15,000) ; Z, $1444.40 ($6500).
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an advancement upon his settlement.2 9 Such advancement should be
determined by the court, based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.30 When this amount is determined, the insurer is notified that it
is to pay the amount of the advancement.
3. A procedure for effecting the pro rata distribution should be es-
tablished. The writer feels that the use of the interlocutory judgment
under the New York statute3 ' in the Bleinteyer case is basically a good
one. The statute should provide a definite time in which such a suit in
equity3 2 must be brought, and such time should be as soon as possible
after the accident.33 An additional provision is needed to meet the
contingency whereby the suit for the interlocutory judgment is not
brought within the prescribed time.3 4
4. There shall be a right to appeal by any party, plaintiff or defendant,
from any judgment rendered in an action at law.35
5. There shall be an alternative right of claimants to enter into a volun-
tary agreement among themselves for proportionate distribution.
6. The proportionate distribution of the insurance fund shall not relieve
- There are, the writer feels, two major reasons why an injured party is willing
to settle. One is that he is uncertain and in doubt that he can recover in an action
at law. The other is that the injured party or his family, in case of death, needs
immediate cash to meet the expense of the necessities of life.
When the latter reason is the motivating factor, there would be no inducement
to the injured party to settle if he could not get this immediate relief. Therefore,
a provision for an advancement on his settlement should be able to meet this
situation.
30 For example, under the hypothetical case, X settled for $3500, and M settled
for $6000. An advancement might be computed by taking the amount of the
settlement, divided by twice the number of persons injured. Therefore, X would
receive around $290, and M would receive $500. Of course, the advancement
would be credited against the claimant's final proportionate share. The court, the
writer feels, should be given the power, in their discretion, to determine the formula
for such advancements, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.31 See note 15, supra.
- The statute could provide that the suit in equity for the interlocutory judg-
ment may be brought by any claimant, on behalf of himself and all the other
claimants, or by the insurer.
Cost of this suit should be divided among the claimants. Cost for services in
bringing the suit, the writer feels, should be set by the court upon a quantufnmrcruit
basis.
" The interlocutory judgment should direct that all claims be perfected by a
certain, fixed date, in order for a claimant to be entitled to share in the pro rata
distribution of the fund.
However, the date of distribution should be soon enough after the accident-
that the insurer will not get a new power to force settlements in order that a
claimant may get an advancement.
Some provision may prove to be needed for allowing review of a settlement where
it appears the settlement is excessive in proportion to the claimant's injury. How-
ever, except in cases of a fraudulent scheme between an insurer and one of the
claimants, such a provision is needless, since the original amount of the settlement
should still be good against the insured as representing an excess due over the
proceeds of the insurance fund.
" The statute may provide that it is the duty of the insurer to bring this action
in equity if a claimant has not done so within the prescribed time.
" Some provision will be needed to define how a claimant's share will be set
aside until final judgment is rendered.
[Vol. 35
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the insured from liability for that amount due claimants in excess of the
obligation of the insurer.
7. The proportionate distribution of the insurance fund shall not re-
lieve the insurer from his duty to defend all suits against the insured,
when the policy of insurance so provides.
The writer feels that this addition to our insurance law will bring
North Carolina one step closer to better protection of innocent parties
from the irresponsible motorist and to realization of equality for all.
BENJAMIN S. MARKS, JR.
Insurance-Soliciting Agent-Waiver of Initial Policy Provisions
In the case of Life and Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Gurley,"
recently before the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals,
the court was faced with the question of whether a valid insurance con-
tract bad come into existence. The applicant had made application2 for
a plan of life insurance calling for a $99.00 quarterly premium. The
premium was paid at the time of application and a receipt3 given. A
policy of the plan applied for was issued, but at a quarterly premium of
$122.00, the applicant having been given a "Class B" rate. The appli-
cant refused to pay the premium increase or accept the policy, and re-
quested the local agent to get the policy issued at the standard rate.4
1229 F. 2d 326 (4th Cir. 1956). The district court decision appears in 132 F.
Supp. 289 (1955).
'The application was signed by the applicant and stated in part, "3) With the ex-
ception of officers of the Company, notice to or knowledge of the agent, medical
examiner or any other person is not notice to or knowledge of the Company unless
stated in either Part A or B of this application, and none of such persons are
authorized to accept risks or pass upon insurability, nor shall any of such persons
have the power on behalf of the Company to make or modify any contract on behalf
of the Company or to waive any of the Companies rights or requirements." The
policy contained the following provision. "ENTIRE CONTRACT . . . only the
President, a Vice-President, Secretary, and Assistant Secretary, Actuary, or
Treasurer has power on behalf of the Company to make or modify this contract."
And on the back of the policy, "NOTICE TO POLICYHOLDERS . . . The
Company's agents have no authority to alter or amend the Policy, to accept
premiums in arrears, or to extend the due date of any premium."
'The receipt stated in part, "If this sum is equal to the first full premium on
the policy applied for then if the Company shall be satisfied that at the time of
completion of the medical examination or Part B of the application, if no medical
examination is required, that the risk was acceptable to the Company under its
rules, for the plan and amount of insurance herein applied for at the rate of premium,
declared paid, then the insurance shall be in force as of the date of completion of
the medical examination, or of Part B of the application if no medical examination
is required, but otherwise no insurance shall be in force under said application unless
and until a policy has been issued and delivered and the first full premium
stipulated in the policy has actually been paid to and accepted by the Company
during the lifetime and continued insurability of the applicant. The above sum
shall be refunded upon request if the application is declined or if the policy is issued
other than as applied for and is not accepted by the applicant."
'The district court record reveals that the applicant was at one time a life
insurance salesman. Transcript of Record, Page 20, 132 F. Supp. 289 (1955).
Question addressed to Tklrs. Gurley, wife of applicant. "Q. Mr. Gurley as a matter
of fact used to be a life insurance salesman? A. Yes, Sir."
